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                                                           Abstract 
There has been increasing interest in the so-called ‘resource curse’, i.e. the tendency of resource-
rich countries to underperform in several development outcomes. This has generated a mountain of 
(often contradictory) evidence leaving many floundering in the flood of information. The special 
issue compiles eight papers from some of the most prominent contributors to this literature, 
combining original research with critical reflection on the current stock of knowledge. The studies 
collectively emphasize the complexities and conditionalities of the ‘curse’ – its presence/intensity 
is largely context-specific, depending on the type of resources, socio-political institutions and 
linkages with the rest of the economy. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
 
There has been an increasing interest within the scientific and policy communities in the ‘resource 
curse’; that is, the tendency of resource rich (and mineral rich, in particular) economies to 
underperform in economic growth and other development outcomes. Academic interest has 
certainly been on the rise – a Google Scholar search shows that while there were only 13 scientific 
papers that explicitly referred to the so-called ‘resource curse’ in 1995, the number increased to 
543 in 2005 and 2360 in 2015. This level of academic focus combined with greater awareness 
through media reporting has also influenced policy circles, as evident from the launching of 
several voluntary initiatives in recent years (such as the Extractive Industries Transparency 
Initiative (EITI), the Global Mining Initiative, the Responsible Mineral Development Initiative 
and the Kimberley Process Certification Scheme, just to name a few) that aim at improved 
transparency in the extractive sector and a more equitable and productive use of accrued rents.  
 Yet, after 20 years of intensive research and action, ‘the curse’ still lingers as a very real 
global problem, as evident from the multiple challenges many mineral-rich countries currently 
face. Mineral prices are highly volatile and their see-saw pattern often creates abrupt business 
cycles for mineral-dependent economies – oil rich Russia, Venezuela and Trinidad and Tobago 
have recently experienced severe economic contractions as a result of the plummeting oil prices.   
Saudi Arabia’s budget deficit soared to approximately $100 billion (or 15 per cent of GDP) in 
2015, prompting the kingdom to announce drastic cuts in fuel subsidies. In Brazil, the state-run oil 
giant Petrobras has been embroiled in a multi-billion corruption scandal since late-2014 with 
allegations that company funds were diverted to several politicians. Oil smuggling in Syria and 
Iraq has assisted the Islamic State to fuel its insurgency, with claims that the terrorist group has 
formed informal trading networks with other neighbouring countries. 
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 Evidence on the impacts of mineral abundance/dependence on several development outcomes 
(economic growth, income levels, conflict, environmental quality, institutions/social capital, trade, 
debt and so forth) has been the subject of numerous studies in the last two decades (for recent 
reviews of the empirical literature, see Frankel, 2010; Gilberthorpe & Papyrakis, 2015; Ross, 
2014). The evidence, though, has been far from conclusive, and in recent years there have been 
several studies disputing the universal existence of a resource curse (for example, see 
Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2008; Cavalcanti, Mohaddes, & Raissi, 2011; Stijns, 2005, 2006). 
Nowadays, there is wider recognition that the resource curse is a much more complex 
phenomenon, the manifestation of which depends on several factors (for instance, on the type of 
natural resources, the way one measures their relative importance in an economy, the socio-
political institutions in place and so forth).  
 As with any research field that produces such an abundance of information over a period of 
two decades, there is a need at a certain point in time to pause and critically reflect on what we 
have learned so far (and on the gaps that still remain to be filled). The objective of this special 
issue is, on the one hand, to provide a synthesis of the key messages that the scientific and policy 
community can draw based on the intensive research undertaken in the resource curse field. At the 
same time, it incorporates current original research in the field (with eight papers from some of the 
most prominent contributors to this literature), combined with a critical reflection on the current 
stock of knowledge. The studies included in the special issue reflect the current academic 
pluralism that characterises the resource curse literature with a mix of different methodological 
approaches (both quantitative and qualitative analyses) and a diverse geographical focus (Latin 
America, Sub-Saharan Africa, global). They also examine a broad range of resource curse 
mechanisms (Dutch Disease, rent-seeking, conflict and so forth) and for several types of natural 
resources (oil, gold, diamonds and so forth). The studies collectively emphasize the complexities 
and conditionalities of the ‘curse’ – its presence/intensity being largely context-specific, 
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depending on the type of resources, socio-political institutions and linkages with the rest of the 
economy. 
 The remainder of this Introduction to the Special Issue is organised as follows. Section II 
provides a critical review of the evolution of the resource curse literature and draws attention to 
some common issues emerging. Section III presents the eight papers of the special issue and their 
(theoretical/empirical) contribution to multiple research themes appearing in the resource curse 
literature. Section IV provides a synthesis of key results presented in the special issue and offers 
some general conclusions. 
 
II. THE RESOURCE CURSE: THE EVOLUTION OF THE LITERATURE 
 
While interest in the resource curse intensified over the last two decades, some earlier work of 
development economists already in the 1950s focused on the possible adversities of mineral-based 
development; and more explicitly on the deteriorating terms of trade between primary products and 
manufactured goods, commonly referred to as the Prebisch-Singer hypothesis (a trend that was 
reversed during the 2000’s primary commodities boom – see Harvey, Kellard, Madsen, & Wohar, 
2010 for a recent review of long-term historical trends, as well as the original papers by Prebisch, 
1950 and Singer, 1950). Subsequently, several economics studies concentrated attention also on the 
crowding-out effect of minerals on a diverse range of activities that encourage economic and broader 
development. In the 1980s (following the two oil crises of the 1970s), there was considerable 
academic interest into the mechanisms that link mineral booms with limited economic diversification 
and trade openness − Dutch Disease models (first developed by Max Corden and Peter Neary) 
explored how positive income shocks triggered by mineral discoveries and changes in prices can 
create either inflationary pressures that decrease the competitiveness of exporting firms or relocate 
production factors towards the primary sectors away from other tradable industries (these are the so-
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called Spending and Resource Movement effects; see the original papers by Corden & Neary, 1982 
and Corden, 1984, as well as subsequent variants, e.g. Aizenman & Lee, 2010; Krugman, 1987; 
Matsuyama, 1992). These problems were thought to be further exacerbated by the fact that 
governments in mineral-rich nations often lacked far-sighted industrial competitive policies so as to 
protect entrenched interests in certain sectors (see Auty, 1994; Auty & Pontara, 2008; Murshed & 
Serino, 2011). 
 In the mid-1990s, two new studies re-ignited interest in the development impacts of natural 
resource abundance. In 1993, Richard Auty’s book with a selection of case studies exploring 
macroeconomic policy in mineral-dependent economies largely popularised the ‘resource curse’ as a 
term (see Auty, 1993). In 1995, Jeffrey Sachs and Andrew Warner provided the first cross-country 
empirical study that demonstrated a negative link between mineral abundance (measured by either the 
share of primary exports or mineral production in GDP in 1971) and long-term economic growth 
(measured by changes in GDP per capita between 1970-1989), as well as estimations of the 
underlying crowding-out mechanisms (that is, the negative links between mineral resources and trade 
openness, investment in physical capital, bureaucratic efficiency and inflation; see Sachs and Warner, 
1995). Subsequently, much of the focus concentrated on the negative impact of natural resources on 
long-term economic growth with additional explanations behind the curse being put forward. For 
example, some studies claimed that mineral resource abundance can be related to a debt overhang, 
with mineral rich states using their natural reserves as collateral for debt in international markets (see 
Manzano & Rigobon, 2001; Sarr, Bulte, Meisner, & Swanson, 2011). Other studies claimed that 
investment in human capital (proxied by the share of educational expenditure in GDP or school 
enrolment rates) is correlated negatively with measures of mineral abundance (given that the 
extractive industries are often less human-capital intensive; see Gylfason, 2001; Birdsall, Pinckney, & 
Sabot, 2001; Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 2004). There has also been evidence suggesting that the price 
volatility of natural resources traded in international markets probably also contributes to 
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macroeconomic fluctuations and uncertainty for foreign investors (see van der Ploeg & Poelhekke, 
2009).  
 In more recent years, considerable interest grew towards the institutional explanations of the 
resource curse that look at how mineral resources can weaken pro-development institutions – for 
example, by fuelling rent-seeking and corruption (see Bulte, Damania, & Deacon, 2005; Isham, 
Woodcock, Pritchett, & Busby, 2005; Leite & Weidman, 2002), reducing democratic accountability 
(by providing authoritarian regimes with the means to prolong their stay in power either through 
oppression or targeted redistribution; see Jensen & Wantchekon, 2004; Ross, 2001, 2009) and 
encouraging violent conflict (Collier & Hoeffler 2005; Welsch, 2008; Wick & Bulte, 2006). 
Additionally, new analysis moved beyond growth impacts and instead explored negative links 
between mineral abundance and broader human development indices and sustainability indicators (for 
example, Bulte, Damania, & Deacon, 2005; Daniele, 2011; Atkinson, 2003; Dietz, Neumayer, & de 
Soysa, 2007). 
 The resource curse literature has become very diverse over time – while, at the beginning, most 
of the analysis focused on impacts at the macro/country level, several papers gradually shifted 
attention also to the meso (region) and micro (community) levels. Some recent papers have shown 
that mineral-rich and mineral-poor regions within sovereign countries also follow different 
development trajectories (and for reasons similar to the ones explaining cross-country differences; for 
example, see Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 2007 for the US, Shao & Qi, 2009 and Zhang, Xing, Fan, & Luo, 
2008 for China; Papyrakis & Raveh, 2014 for Canada; Angrist & Kugler, 2008 for Colombia and 
Buccellato & Mickiewitz, 2009 for Russia). In parallel, although quite independently, a separate 
substream of the resource curse literature, dominated by anthropologists, sociologists, ethnographers 
and other social scientists, has probed into the development impacts of the extractive industries at the 
micro/community level (see Banks, 2007, 2009; Gilberthorpe, 2013, 2014; Golub, 2007; Bainton, 
2008; Hilson, 2006). This micro resource curse literature, as a result of the scholarly prevalence by 
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non-economists, has examined the resource curse from a different angle; that is, with a closer focus 
on the impacts of the extractive industry on individual agency and community relationships. Some of 
these studies have looked at how resource extraction can exacerbate poverty for nearby communities 
(Hilson, 2010, 2012) or stimulate gender inequalities and social fragmentation (Macintyre, 2003). 
Many of these community-based studies explore the cultural aspects of the resource curse, and in 
particular, how indigenous populations, with little exposure to a market transaction-based economy, 
may struggle with the peculiarities associated with mineral extraction (Bainton, 2008; Crook, 2007). 
Tensions between the state/corporate sector and the indigenous communities in mineral-rich areas 
often result in social dislocation and conflict (Watts, 2008; Arellano-Yanguas, 2011). Several of these 
studies critique the tendency of extractive multinational companies to use the rhetoric of 
‘sustainability’ and ‘corporate social responsibility’ to legitimise activities that often result in 
environmental damage and social disruption (Benson & Kirsch, 2010; Gilberthorpe & Banks, 2012). 
 Over the last decade, in particular, the literature became much more critical with several studies 
disputing the universality of the resource curse and, instead, highlighting the complexities and 
conditionalities of the phenomenon. Several studies emphasize that the type of natural resources 
matters and that the ‘resource curse’ is a ‘mineral curse’ at large. These studies distinguish between 
point and diffuse resources, with the former usually being geographically concentrated and exploited 
by a smaller share of the population (as in the case of mineral resources), and the latter being more 
widely dispersed (as in the case of agriculture). Most scholars nowadays agree that it is typically the 
extractive industries (rather than the diffuse resources) to blame for resource curse phenomena (Bulte 
et al., 2005; Lederman & Maloney, 2007) – oil and diamonds, in particular, receive most attention in 
the branch of the resource curse literature that focuses on democracy and conflict (see Olsson, 2007; 
Lujala, 2010; Ross, 2001; Tsui, 2011). Studies have also started to reflect more critically on how to 
proxy resource richness. Typically, the strong negative relationship between economic growth and 
mineral wealth (commonly found in empirical studies) disappears, when the latter is expressed in per 
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capita terms rather than as a share of overall economic activity (that is, GDP or total exports) – 
Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2008 refer to the former measure as ‘resource abundance’ and to the latter 
as ‘resource dependence’. Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) criticise measures of resource 
dependence as suffering from endogeneity problems (given that the denominator of the ratio is itself 
influenced by natural resources and other growth-related factors). Van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 
(2010) replicate the analysis by Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) by replacing their original proxy of 
resource abundance (a measure of per capita subsoil wealth, which van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 
claim is likely to depend on resource rents and GDP growth) with the value of ‘not yet extracted 
reserves per capita’ provided by Norman (2009) – their results are in line with the earlier findings by 
Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) with no evidence of a negative direct link between resource 
abundance and subsequent growth. That seems to suggest that the resource curse depends on the 
relative (rather than the absolute) importance/size of the extractive sector compared to the rest of the 
economy. 
 An increasing number of studies has also devoted attention to how institutions can condition the 
effect of mineral wealth on several development outcomes. Good institutions that ensure property 
rights protection can discourage rent-seeking behaviour in mineral-rich contexts and, hence, prevent 
resource curse phenomena and stimulate economic development (Boschini, Pettersson, & Roine, 
2007; Sarmidi, Law, & Jafari, 2014). The core message of these studies is that good institutions (in 
the form of secure property rights, efficient bureaucracies and low corruption) improve resource 
windfall management and can turn the curse into a blessing (El Anshasy & Katsaiti, 2013, Mehlum, 
Moene, & Torvik, 2006). In a similar vein, Arezki and Brückner (2010, 2012) find that mineral price 
booms lead to excessive government spending and sovereign bond spreads (a measure of 
macroeconomic uncertainty) in the presence of autocratic rulers. 
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III. COMPOSITION AND CONTRIBUTION OF SPECIAL ISSUE 
 
After two decades of intensive research and a large amount of (often contradictory) evidence, 
there is a need to critically reflect on what we have learned so far, in combination with some new 
evidence regarding the complex relationships between natural resource wealth and socio-
economic development. This has been the common objective of the eight papers of this special 
issue – through their academic pluralism (in terms of methodological diversity, and broad focus on 
different types of resources and regions) they highlight the complexities and conditionalities 
associated with the resource curse. Table 1 below provides an overview of the papers included in 
the special issue, summarising their key focus and methodological approach. Table 2 provides a 
summary of their key findings. 
 
Insert Table 1 
Insert Table 2 
 
 The first three papers of the special issue have a broader focus and provide some general 
reflection on earlier research, methodological challenges and conceptual dimensions associated 
with the resource curse. The paper by Gilberthorpe and Rajak (2017) provides a review of the 
contribution anthropological research has made over the past two decades to the resource curse 
literature; particularly in understanding the dynamic interplay of social relations, economic 
interests and struggles over power in the political economy of extraction. They claim that the 
anthropology of extraction has shown how global flows of resource capital unsettle, entrench or 
generate new forms of dependence, patronage and clientelism locally. They also emphasize the 
contribution of anthropology to problematising the ‘resource curse’ by illuminating the powerful 
agency within the forces of extraction and the experiences of those who become subject to them. 
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The resource curse analysis is, hence, incomplete when abstracted from the social politics and 
power relations that characterise extraction. The anthropological approach to the resource curse 
provides a methodological toolkit that allows to analyse how resource extraction generates and 
reshapes social relations between corporate actors, state officials, and local ‘stakeholders’ 
(creating, hence, new domains for the exercise of power, and new struggles over authority). 
 While the study by Gilberthorpe and Rajak (2007) focuses on qualitative research, the paper 
by van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2017) shifts attention to recent quantitative evidence of the 
resource curse and provides a critical review of new methods, datasets and empirical analysis. 
They first discuss the problems that earlier macro-econometric evidence on the resource curse is 
fraught with (endogeneity of mineral wealth measures, multicollinearity, omitted variable bias) 
and continue to discuss new empirical approaches that offer better identification strategies and 
more reliable estimates. These include the use of data on big oil discoveries (to capture 
anticipation effects that precede extraction), the use of natural experiments, a preference for 
within-country econometric evidence and a focus on localised impacts in the vicinity of mineral 
activity. 
 The paper by Collier (2017) is conceptual in nature and draws upon recent developments in 
social psychology to put forward unexplored explanations of the resource curse. While the papers 
by Gilberthorpe and Rajak (2017) and van der Ploeg and Poelhekke (2017) concentrate attention 
to past research, his paper proposes new avenues for future research. He discusses how, in the 
absence of an active government communications policy, psychological biases interact with 
resource discoveries to generate mass opinions that contribute to resource curse phenomena. The 
assignment of spatial/temporal ownership (of mineral resources) is a social construct – 
psychological biases that favour allocation towards local claims and the current generations lead to 
conflict, populism and excessive consumption. 
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 The next five papers of the special issue provide original analysis on different mechanisms of 
the resource curse. The paper by Hilson and Laing (2017) provides an ethnographic exploration 
behind the underwhelming economic performance of gold-rich Guyana over the last two decades. 
While many papers in the literature link the resource curse to the failure of foreign mining 
multinationals to induce a trickle-down effect to the rest of economy (see the review paper by 
Gilberthorpe & Rajak (2017) in this special issue), Hilson and Laing also show that ‘going small 
and local’ is not necessarily the ideal blueprint for sustained economic development. Their 
analysis demonstrates how a gold mining economy built around local small-scale operators does 
not avoid the resource curse pitfalls, at least in the absence of a strong institutional framework that 
discourages rent-seeking, constrains excessive spending, supports economic diversification and 
avoids the concentration of wealth in the hands of few mineral-dependent elites. 
 On the other hand, the paper by Porter and Watts (2017) offers a subnational case study of an 
atypical ‘resource curse escape’; they analyse the case of the Edo state in the oil rich Niger delta 
region, as a success story that strikingly contrasts with the dismal performance of Nigeria as a 
whole (which is often presented as one of the worst examples of a resource curse, as a result of 
contentious politics and a corrupt and ineffective system of fiscal federalism). They emphasize 
how local political and technical capability helped create reform space and deliver political results 
(particularly in the form of road projects) that appealed to a wide range of constituencies, 
generated employment and facilitated commercial activity. 
 The paper by Auty (2017) looks at the resource curse from the perspective of two small island 
economies, sugar-rich Mauritius and oil-rich Trinidad and Tobago. The historical comparison of 
these two economies, with very similar initial conditions other than their mineral endowment, 
allows to attribute their divergent development paths to their differences in hydrocarbon rents. 
Mauritius overcame potential disadvantages of size, remoteness and resource paucity by adopting 
an unfashionable policy of manufactured exports that systematically diversified and strengthened 
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its economy. In contrast, Trinidad and Tobago absorbed oil rents too rapidly, triggering Dutch 
Disease effects and intensifying risky dependence upon hydrocarbon reserves that face depletion 
within a decade. 
 The paper by Voors, Bulte, Papaioannou and van der Windt (2017) contributes to the 
literature on conflict and natural resource availability by linking within-country spatial and 
temporal patterns in conflict data (in the lines suggested by van der Ploeg & Poelhekke (2017)) to 
the quality of governance at the chiefdom level and to georeferenced locations of pre-war diamond 
mines. The innovation and contribution of their paper lies in investigating the motivations behind 
conflict at a disaggregated level, utilising local measures of governance and resource availability 
that are often unavailable for developing countries. They find that neither diamonds nor the quality 
of local governance robustly explain local variation in conflict intensity against the backdrop of 
the intense and prolonged Sierra Leone’s war. 
 While several papers in this special issue highlight the preventive role of good institutions 
against the resource curse (for example, the papers by Auty (2017) and Porter & Watts (2017)), 
the analysis by Papyrakis, Rieger and Gilberthorpe (2017), instead of treating institutions as static,  
looks at how these evolve over time using macroeconomic panel data for a large sample of 
countries. More specifically, they assess how participation in the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (an international standard launched in 2002 to increase transparency in 
mineral rich states) can assist member countries to improve their institutions. They find that EITI 
membership offers, on the whole, a shielding mechanism against the general tendency of mineral-
rich countries to experience increases in corruption over time. 
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IV. SYNTHESIS 
 
The eight papers of the special issue aim to capture the current diversity of the resource curse 
literature, through their substantial variation in methodological approaches (both quantitative and 
qualitative analyses) and geographical focus (Latin America, Sub-Saharan Africa, global). While, 
for many years the resource curse was largely seen as a macroeconomic issue, there is now a 
wider recognition that methodological diversity is vital in understanding the complex and varied 
social, political and economic aspects of the phenomenon both at the global and local level. The 
special issue is hence a rare attempt to provide a more holistic and interdisciplinary picture of the 
resource curse and its multi-scale effects. 
 Taken together the studies collectively emphasize the complexities and conditionalities of the 
‘curse’ – its presence/intensity being largely context-specific, depending on the type of resources, 
socio-political institutions and linkages with the rest of the economy and society. Several key 
messages arise. First, the resource curse can take place at multiple levels (at the country, regional 
or local level) and many of its effects are not directly quantifiable (for instance the impacts on 
social and cultural capital; see Gilberthorpe & Rajak, 2017) – it is for this reason, that a multi-
scale, multi-disciplinary approach is necessary. The experience of resource-rich regions (for 
example, in terms of economic performance or conflict) is often different to the overall experience 
of the country to which they belong (see Voors, Bulte, Papaioannou, & van der Windt, 2017; 
Porter and Watts, 2017). Second, the resource curse is by no means an iron law – several 
countries, regions and communities have avoided the curse by encouraging economic 
diversification, investment and an equitable distribution of accrued rents (Auty, 2017; Porter & 
Watts, 2017. In many cases, good institutions in place (or adhering to an international standard, 
such as the EITI) can play a vital moderating role in transforming the curse into a blessing 
(Papyrakis, Rieger, & Gilberthorpe, 2017). Third, while it might be tempting to blame large 
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multinationals for resource curse phenomena (particular in the context of environmental 
destruction and lack of positive spillovers to the rest of the economy/society), extractive sectors 
built around local small-scale operators do not necessarily avoid the resource curse pitfalls (see 
Hilson & Laing, 2017). Last, there is still a lot that we do not know about the resource curse and 
its manifestations – it is only during the last few years that new disaggregated data have allowed 
us to identify (possibly more accurately) the localised impacts in the vicinity of mineral activity 
(van der Ploeg & Poelhekke, 2017). Recent developments in social psychology (that focus on 
anticipation effects that precede extraction or psychological biases that define resource allocation) 
can further advance our knowledge in the field (Coller, 2017; van der Ploeg & Poelhekke, 2017).   
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Table 1. Special Issue Papers – Main Characteristics 
 Type of 
resources 
Outcome variables Time period Scale Type of 
analysis 
Methods 
1. Gilberthorpe and 
Rajak  
Minerals Social relations, inequities Multiple Several countries 
(Local/Community level) 
Qualitative Review of recent 
anthropological 
research 
2. van der Ploeg and 
Poelhekke 
Minerals Several economic variables 
(growth, investment and so 
forth), conflict, democracy, 
corruption 
Multiple Several countries 
(Micro/Meso/Macro) 
Qualitative Review of recent 
econometric 
research 
3. Collier Minerals Conflict, investment Multiple Several countries 
(Macro) 
Qualitative Conceptual paper 
4. Hilson and Laing Gold Corruption, rent-seeking, 
economic diversification 
Late-1990s 
to 2014 
Guyana 
(Micro/Meso/Macro) 
Qualitative Ethnographic Study 
5. Porter and Watts Oil Institutional reforms, 
governance, infrastructure 
Early-1990s 
to 2012 
Nigeria 
(Subnational – Edo state) 
Qualitative Political Ecology 
6. Auty Sugar, oil Economic growth, 
diversification, employment 
1960s to 
2012 
Mauritius / Trinidad and 
Tobago 
(Macro) 
Qualitative/ 
Quantitative 
Case study 
comparison 
7. Voors, Bulte, 
Papaioannou and 
van der Windt 
Diamonds Conflict 1991-2002 Sierra Leone 
(Subnational) 
Quantitative Econometric 
analysis 
8. Papyrakis, Rieger 
and Gilberthorpe 
Minerals, oil Corruption, institutions 2002-2011 Several countries 
(Macro) 
Quantitative Econometric 
analysis 
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Table 2. Summary of findings 
1. Gilberthorpe and Rajak  The anthropological approach to the resource curse provides a complementary methodological toolkit to analyse how 
resource extraction generates and reshapes social relations between corporate actors, state officials, and the local 
population. This is vital in understanding how existing forms of extraction entrench, unsettle or generate new forms 
of inequality, friction and dispossession in resource curse affected areas.  
2. van der Ploeg and 
Poelhekke 
New quantitative approaches increase the reliability of resource curse impacts: these include the use of data on big oil 
discoveries, the use of natural experiments, a preference for within-country econometric evidence and a focus on 
localised impacts in the vicinity of mineral activity. 
3. Collier A critical mass of informed citizens (on the spatial and temporal assignment of resource ownership) can be a 
prerequisite for avoiding psychological biases that lead to conflict and excessive spending in a mineral-rich context. 
4. Hilson and Laing A gold mining economy built around local small-scale operators does not avoid the resource curse pitfalls, at least in 
the absence of a strong institutional framework  
5. Porter and Watts Local good governance can create reform space and a ‘resource curse escape’, even when the general political 
environment at the country level is far from favourable. 
6. Auty Comparison of economies with very similar initial conditions other than their mineral endowment (namely, 
Mauritius; Trinidad and Tobago) allows to attribute divergent development paths (and government policies) to their 
differences in hydrocarbon rents.  
7. Voors, Bulte, 
Papaioannou and van der 
Windt 
Neither diamonds nor the quality of local governance robustly explain local variation in conflict intensity against the 
backdrop of the intense and prolonged Sierra Leone’s war. 
8. Papyrakis, Rieger and 
Gilberthorpe 
Mineral rich countries that participate in the Extractive Industry Transparency shield themselves against an 
institutional resource curse (that is, they experience a reduction in corruption levels).  
 
